Property:PosZhenRangNotes
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This is a property of type Text.
B
This assertion is applied retroactively since he predates the category.
*"bCom-ldan-ral-gri of sNar-thang monastery is, according to Tāranātha, a forerunner of the gzhan stong tradition established by Dol-po-pa. bCom-ldan-ral-gri, in his RGV commentary, does not systematically teach the gzhan stong doctrine (and is not, of course, aware that he would later be considered a gzhan stong forerunner), but he does expound some fragmentary elements that possibly fink him to the gzhan stong position of Dol-po-pa". [[Kano, K.]], ''[[Buddha-Nature and Emptiness]]'', p. 342.
*"Given Rikrel's interpretation of the ''Uttaratantra'', it is no wonder that later Jonang scholars would retrospectively include him in the Jonang lineage of other-emptiness transmission, even though he does not employ terms such as "other-emptiness" and "all-basis-gnosis" (''kun gzhi ye shes''), which would become crucial for Dölpopa's presentation of tathāgata-essence." [[Wangchuk, Tsering]]. ''[[The Uttaratantra in the Land of Snows]]'', p. 30. +
He predates the category, but as Stearns remarks, "Tsen Kawoché . . . is often thought to be the first Tibetan to have taught what later came to be known as the Zhentong view." See [[Stearns, C.]], [[The Buddha from Dolpo]], pp. 42–3 and pp. 88–9. +
Though he didn't explicitly equate his position with Rangtong, he was certainly a vocal opponent of Dölpopa and his Zhentong view. +
D
He was not the first to use the term, but he was the one to define and make it a central feature of his innovative philosophical position:
*"According to traditional Tibetan accounts, the revolutionary theory that the ultimate is not "empty of an own-being” (''rang stong'') but “empty of other” (''gzhan stong'') arose in Dölpopas mind during a Kālacakra retreat at Jonang. Lhai Gyaltsen informs us that Dölpopas realization was connected with the ''Kālacakratantra'' and the construction of the great ''stūpa'' in Jonang, which was consecrated in 1333. One of the first works in which Dölpopa expressed his new zhentong understanding of the Buddhist doctrine was his famous ''Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho''. His last major work was the ''Bka bsdu bzhi pa'' (''Bka' bsdu bzhi pa'i don bstan rtsis chen po'', ''The Great Reckoning of the Doctrine That Has the Significance of a Fourth Council''), which can be seen as a final summary of Dölpopas views." [[Mathes, K.]], ''[[A Direct Path to the Buddha Within]]'', p. 75. +
K
*He never actually uses this term, so this is a later attribution imputed on to his exegesis of the RGV and other works by his commentators such as Karma Trinlepa and eventually Kongtrul, which is labeled the Zhentong Tradition of the Karma Kagyu, which differs considerably from Dölpopa's tradition. See [[Mathes, K.]], ''[[A Direct Path to the Buddha Within]]'', pp. 54-57.
*For more on the difference between the Third Karmapa and Dölpopa see [[Mathes, K.]], ''[[A Direct Path to the Buddha Within]]'', p. 69-70.
*See also [[Brunnhölzl, K.]], ''[[Luminous Heart]]'', pp. 95-109.
+
This is a tricky issue, as he generally predates this categorization though he does use the term, sparingly, in some of his writings, though not in the same way that it would come to be characterized by Dolpopa. Though some traditional scholars, such as Kongtrul, consider him a zhentongpa, this is not a common Nyingma view. For relevant discussions of this issue see:
*[[Mathes, K.]], [[A Direct Path to the Buddha Within]], pp. 98-99.
*[[Wangchuk, Dorji]], [[The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory]], pp. 174-178. +
M
It is not entirely clear that he would identify with the Rangtong view, but he seems to have issues with Zhentong, as Brunnhölzl points out:
"Also, the emptiness taught in the buddha nature sūtras and the Uttaratantra is not "the emptiness of one’s being empty of something other," which is said to be the worst kind of emptiness in the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'', but corresponds to this sūtra’s 'great ultimate emptiness of the wisdom of the noble ones.'" [[Brunnhölzl, K.]], ''[[When the Clouds Part]]'', p. 310. +
Though his view is nuanced and he at times wrote from both perspectives. Following are some examples of these variations.
*He aligns his view with Nāgārjuna, but seems to assert rangtong in terms of the relative and zhentong in terms of the ultimate, as Duckworth quotes Mipam's ''Lion's Roar'':
"First it is necessary to ascertain the lack of intrinsic nature of all phenomena in accordance with the scriptures of the protector Nāgārjuna; because if this is not known, one will not be able to ascertain the manner that relative [phenomena] are empty from their own side and the manner that the ultimate is empty of what is other. Therefore, one should first ascertain the freedom from constructs which is what is known reflexively." [[Duckworth, D.]], ''[[Mipam on Buddha-Nature]]'', p. 71.
*However, Mipam is also quoted as stating:
"In the tradition of self-emptiness, since there is only the ultimately nonexistent, an ultimately existing phenomenon is impossible. In the tradition of other-emptiness, what is ultimately nonexistent is the relative, and what is ultimately existent is the ultimate itself. My tradition is clear in the ''Rapsel Rejoinder'', the tradition propounding self-emptiness." [[Duckworth, D.]], ''[[Mipam on Buddha-Nature]]'', p. 74.
*Mipam's position depends on the definitions used for these terms, as Duckworth points out:
"When we consider Mipam’s depiction of emptiness in light of the categories of “self-emptiness” and “other-emptiness,” we can see that according to Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa’s definitions of a proponent of self-emptiness (claiming a non-implicative negation as the consummate ultimate) and other-emptiness (claiming wisdom as not empty of its own essence), Mipam is a proponent of neither self-emptiness nor other-emptiness. However, according to Lochen’s definitions of self-emptiness and other-emptiness, we see how Mipam can be said to be a proponent of both self-emptiness and other-emptiness!"
And, later on,
"It is clear that Mipam defines himself as a proponent of self-emptiness—as one who propounds that there is nothing ultimately existent—in accord with his definition of the term. [[Duckworth, D.]], ''[[Mipam on Buddha-Nature]]'', p. 74.
P
He predates this debate. +
R
Technically he was more of a precursor to this view, though as an important teacher to Dölpopa, especially for the ''Five Treatises of Maitreya'' it is no wonder that the latter's view is heavily indebted to Rinchen Yeshe. See
*[[Wangchuk, Tsering]]. ''[[The Uttaratantra in the Land of Snows]]'', pp. 35-36.
*[[Brunnhölzl, K.]], ''[[When the Clouds Part]]'', pp. 308-309. +
S
He predates the distinction but is clearly in line with the rangtong perspective. +
Deems zhentong as conventional truth and the lowest form of emptiness and rangtong as the ultimate truth. [[Wangchuk, Tsering]], [[The Uttaratantra in the Land of Snows]], p. 79. +
Affirms that the mind's true nature is not empty of its own qualities, but he does not use the term zhentong. Draszczyk, "A Eulogy of Mind’s Connate Qualities," 2015, p.115 +
T
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