Dignāga: Difference between revisions
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{{Person | {{Person | ||
|MainNamePhon=Dignāga | |||
|SortName=Dignāga | |||
|MainNameTib=ཕྱོགས་གླང་ | |||
|MainNameWylie=phyogs glang | |||
|OtherNames=phyogs kyi glang po | |||
|PersonType=Classical Indian Authors | |||
|bio=Dignāga. [alt. Diṅnāga] (T. Phyogs glang; C. Chenna; J. Jinna; K. Chinna) (c. 480-c. 540). Indian monk regarded as the formalizer of Buddhist logic (nyāya; hetuvidyā). Dignāga was an influential innovator in Buddhist inferential reasoning or logical syllogisms (prayoga; sādhana), an important feature of Indian philosophy more broadly, which occupies a crucial place in later Indian and Tibetan philosophical analysis. The Indian Nyāya (Logic) school advocated that there were five necessary stages in syllogistic reasoning: (1) probandum or proposition (pratijñā), "The mountain is on fire"; (2) reason (hetu), "because there is smoke," (3) analogy (udāharana), "Whatever is smoky is on fire, like a stove, but unlike a lake"; (4) application (upanāya), "Since this mountain is smoky, it is on fire"; (5) conclusion (nigamana), "The mountain is on fire." Using the same example, Dignāga by contrast reduced the syllogism down to only three essential steps: (1) probandum or proposition (pakṣa), "the mountain is on fire"; (2) reason (hetu), "because there is smoke"; (3) exemplification (dṛṣṭānta), "whatever is smoky is on fire, like a stove," and "whatever is not on fire is not smoky, like a lake," or, more simply, "like a stove, unlike a lake." Dignāga is also the first scholiast to incorporate into Buddhism the Vaiśeṣika position that there are only two valid | |||
means of knowledge (pramāṇa): direct perception (pratyakṣa, which also includes for Buddhists the subcategory of Yogipratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Dignāga’s major works include his Pramāņasamuccaya ("Compendium on Valid Means of Knowledge"), Ālambanaparīkṣā ("Investigation of the Object"), and Nyāyamukha ("Primer on Logic"), which is available only in Chinese translation. (Source: "Dignāga." In ''The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism'', 259. Princeton University Press, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n41q.27.) | |||
|images=File:Dignāga.jpg | |||
|yearbirth=C. 480 CE | |||
|yeardeath=Southern India | |||
|classification=People | |classification=People | ||
|pagename=Dignāga | |pagename=Dignāga | ||
|pagecreationdate=24 October 2016 | |pagecreationdate=24 October 2016 | ||
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Revision as of 11:09, 30 August 2023
PersonType | Category:Classical Indian Authors |
---|---|
MainNamePhon | Dignāga |
MainNameTib | ཕྱོགས་གླང་ |
MainNameWylie | phyogs glang |
SortName | Dignāga |
bio | Dignāga. [alt. Diṅnāga] (T. Phyogs glang; C. Chenna; J. Jinna; K. Chinna) (c. 480-c. 540). Indian monk regarded as the formalizer of Buddhist logic (nyāya; hetuvidyā). Dignāga was an influential innovator in Buddhist inferential reasoning or logical syllogisms (prayoga; sādhana), an important feature of Indian philosophy more broadly, which occupies a crucial place in later Indian and Tibetan philosophical analysis. The Indian Nyāya (Logic) school advocated that there were five necessary stages in syllogistic reasoning: (1) probandum or proposition (pratijñā), "The mountain is on fire"; (2) reason (hetu), "because there is smoke," (3) analogy (udāharana), "Whatever is smoky is on fire, like a stove, but unlike a lake"; (4) application (upanāya), "Since this mountain is smoky, it is on fire"; (5) conclusion (nigamana), "The mountain is on fire." Using the same example, Dignāga by contrast reduced the syllogism down to only three essential steps: (1) probandum or proposition (pakṣa), "the mountain is on fire"; (2) reason (hetu), "because there is smoke"; (3) exemplification (dṛṣṭānta), "whatever is smoky is on fire, like a stove," and "whatever is not on fire is not smoky, like a lake," or, more simply, "like a stove, unlike a lake." Dignāga is also the first scholiast to incorporate into Buddhism the Vaiśeṣika position that there are only two valid
means of knowledge (pramāṇa): direct perception (pratyakṣa, which also includes for Buddhists the subcategory of Yogipratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Dignāga’s major works include his Pramāņasamuccaya ("Compendium on Valid Means of Knowledge"), Ālambanaparīkṣā ("Investigation of the Object"), and Nyāyamukha ("Primer on Logic"), which is available only in Chinese translation. (Source: "Dignāga." In The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, 259. Princeton University Press, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n41q.27.) |
YearBirth | C. 480 CE |
YearDeath | Southern India |
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